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Abstract We develop a framework that allows us to emulate standard results
from the “agreeing to disagree" literature with generalised decision functions
(e.g. Bacharach (1985)) in a manner the avoids known incoherences pointed out
by Moses and Nachum (1990). We analyse the implications of the Sure-Thing
Principle, a central assumption. The upshot is that the way in which states
are described matters, and that the results fail if decisions are allowed to
depend on interactive information. Furthermore, using very weak additional
assumptions, we extend all previous results to models with a non-partitional infor-
mation structure in a coherent manner. Finally, we provide agreement theorems
in which the decision functions are not required to satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle.
Keywords Agreeing to disagree, knowledge, common knowledge, belief, informa-
tion, epistemic logic.
JEL classification D80, D83, D89.
1 Introduction
The agreement theorem of Aumann (1976) states that if agents have a common prior
on some event, then if their posteriors are common knowledge, these posteriors must be
equal, even if the agents’ updates are based on different information. This was proved
for posterior probabilities in the context of a partitional information structure.
Briefly, Ω is a finite set of states and any of its subsets E is an event. For each agent
i ∈ N there is an information function Ii : Ω → 2Ω; the information cell Ii(ω) is the
set of states that i conceives as possible at state ω, and for each i ∈ N , it is assumed
that (i) ω ∈ Ii(ω), and (ii) Ii(ω) and Ii(ω′) are either identical or disjoint, so the set
Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} partitions the state space. Furthermore, agent i is said to “know"
event E at state ω′ if ω′ ∈ Ii(ω) ⊆ E; and an operator Ki(.) is defined, where “i knows
event E" is the event Ki(E) = {ω ∈ Ω|Ii(ω) ⊆ E}. Informally, E is common knowledge
for a group of agents G ⊆ N if everyone knows that E, everyone knows that everyone
knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on ad
infinitum.
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The robustness of the result was tested through various generalisations. Still operating
in a partitional structure, Cave (1983) and Bacharach (1985) independently extended
the probabilisitic result to general decision functions, Di : F → A, that map from a field
F of subsets of Ω into an arbitrary set A of actions. To derive the result, it is assumed
that agents have the same decision function (termed “like-mindedness"), and that the
decision functions satisfy what we call the Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle (DSTP ): ∀E ∈
E , (Di(E) = x)→ (Di(∪E∈EE) = x) where E be a set of disjoint events.1 The following
states their result.2
If agents i and j are “like-minded", decision functions satisfy DSTP , in-
formation is partitional, and it is common knowledge at some state ω that
i takes action x and j takes action y, then x = y.
Moses and Nachum (1990) criticise the result above on the grounds that DSTP and like-
mindedness are meaningless in the context of generalised decision functions. Bacharach’s
decision functions map from subsets of Ω to capture the idea that actions must be con-
tingent upon the agent’s information - in a similar manner to the way in which posterior
probabilities are contingent upon the information function at a given state. And, DSTP
is intended to capture the intuition that if one chooses to do x in every case where one
is “better informed" (e.g. Di(Ii(ω)) = x and Di(Ii(ω′)) = x), then one must also choose
to do x when one is more “ignorant". However, one’s decision when one is being more
ignorant in this case is taken to be Di(Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′)) = x. This is problematic because
Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω′) has no defined informational content. It is merely a collection of states, but
it is not obvious what the agent knows in this case, since this set is not an information
cell. So, although Di is in fact defined over Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′), since it is defined over all
subsets of Ω, its meaning is unclear.
The likemindedness assumption is intended to capture the intuition that agents would
take the same decision given the same information, but it is also criticised on similar
grounds. If the decision functions are the same, then this means that i’s decision func-
tion is also defined over j’s information cells. But unless the agents partition the state
space in the same way, j’s information cells are simply collections of states, as far as
i is concerned, without a direct informational interpretation: They are not necessarily
information cells for i.3 This suggests that incoherences arise if decision functions are
allowed to depend on interactive information.4
Moses and Nachum (1990) propose their our solution to the generalised agreement the-
orem by defining a projection from states to an arbitrary set, intended to capture the
information at each state that is relevant to the decision, and the decision functions map
relevant information into actions. Now, relevant information is defined over a variety of
sets of states, so the above criticism is resolved. However they require a stronger version
of the Sure-Thing Principle, which does not require the “disjointness" of the relevant
1The DSTP is trivially satisfied when the decision functions are posterior probabilities.
2Note that Aumann (1976) can be derived as a corollary by defining a common prior probability
distribution over the states, and by setting, for an event E, DEi (Ii(ω)) = Pr(E|Ii(ω)).
3See Moses and Nachum (1990), Lemma 3.2.
4Events of the type: i knows that j knows that E.
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information, which we term the Non-Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle, NDSTP .
More recently, Aumann and Hart (2006) use the framework developed in Aumann (1999)
to reproduce the results of Bacharach and of Moses & Nachum in a coherent approach.
Our approach is largely similar to theirs.
In an altogether different strand of the literature, Samet (1990) and Collins (1997)
prove agreement theorems, restricting themselves to decision functions as posterior prob-
abilities, but in a non-partitional information structure. This is an important line of
investigation since partitional structures imply that agents can only know what is the
case;5 in other words, agents cannot base their decisions on false information. But surely,
it is perfectly plausible for rational agents to do so. The culprit is the assumption that
for all ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ Ii(ω) since the “actual" state is always included in the set of states
that the agent considers possible. Instead, Collins (1997) imposes (i) Ii(ω) 6= ∅ and (ii),
if ω′ ∈ Ii(ω) then Ii(ω′) = Ii(ω). Now, it is possible that ω 6∈ Ii(ω) - in which case ω
is called a blindspot for i since at that state the agent considers it impossible - and the
operator K is now interpreted as a “belief" operator (since it is possible to believe what
is false, but not to know it).
The result requires what we term the Zero-Priors assumption:6 The prior probability dis-
tribution must assign zero probability to every state that is a blindspot for every agent.
It is justified on the grounds that the states that an agent does not consider possible
should not affect the agent’s decision. However, this assumption is forcefully criticised
by Collins (1997): Although it seems reasonable to say that i’s prior must assign zero
probability to the states that i considers impossible, it is not reasonable to also require
i’s prior to also assign zero probability to the states that j considers impossible (although
i might consider them possible).
Finally, in a similar vein, Bonanno and Nehring (1998) prove an agreement theorem in
a non-partitional information structure. They do this by assuming “quasi-coherence"
(defined later), and over functions that satisfy a “properness" condition. If the func-
tion is “quantitative", properness implies the Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle (in a manner
that does not avoid the Moses and Nachum (1990) criticism); and when it is “qualita-
tive", properness is equivalent to the Non-Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle. Of course, this
implies that the interpretation of properness depends on the type of function that is used.
In this paper we use concepts from epistemic logic which allows us to reproduce many
of the results cited above under one coherent framework. This allows us to contrast and
compare the assumptions that underlie the various results, and to gain a deeper un-
derstanding of the conditions under which the agreement theorem holds. Furthermore,
we effectively extend all the results by proving the agreement theorem with fully gen-
eral decision functions and non-partitional information structures, and using the various
different versions of the Sure-Thing Principle in a manner that avoids the incoherences
5Among other things, it must be the case that K(E) ⊆ E.
6Termed “consistency" in Samet (1990).
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discussed in Moses and Nachum (1990).7 We also end with an agreement theorem that
does not require the decision functions to satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle.
2 Epistemic Logic
This section introduces standard concepts from epistemic logic.
Definition 1 (Basic syntax). Define a finite set of atomic propositions, P, which consists
of all propositions that cannot be further reduced. Let denote N the set of all agents.
We then inductively define how to formulate all other formulas in our language, L, via
the following Bachus-Naur Form:
ψ ::= P|¬ψ|(ψ ∧ φ)|(ψ ∨ φ)|(ψ → φ)|(ψ ↔ φ)|i∈Nψ|CG⊆Nψ
Note that i and CG are modal operators, while ¬,∧,∨,→,↔ are the standard
Boolean operators.
Definition 2 (Modal depth). The modal depth md(ψ) of a formula ψ is the maximal
length of a nested sequence of modal operators. This can be defined by the following
recursion on our syntax rules:
md(p) = 0 for any p ∈ P
md(¬ψ) = md(ψ)
md(ψ ∧ φ) = md(ψ ∨ φ) = md(ψ → φ) = md(ψ ↔ φ) = max(md(ψ),md(φ))
md(iψ) = 1 +md(ψ)
md(CGψ) = 1 +md(ψ)
So far, we have pure uninterpreted syntax. However, we can now introduce our
semantics, to determine the truth or falsity of formulas.
Definition 3 (Kripke semantics). A frame is a pair 〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉, where Ω is a finite, non-
empty set of states (or “possible worlds), and Ri ⊆ Ω × Ω is a binary relation for each
agent i, also called the accessibility relation for agent i. A model on a frame 〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉,
is a tripleM = 〈Ω, Ri∈N ,V〉, where V : P × Ω→ {0, 1} is a valuation map.
Definition 4 (Truth). A formula ψ is true at state ω in model M = 〈Ω, Ri∈N ,V〉,
7Although still working with a partitional structure, Samet (2010) takes an altogether different ap-
proach, deriving a generalised agreement theorem by assuming an “interpersonal" Sure-Thing Principle
(ISTP ), which is a condition imposed on decision functions across different agents. The generalisation
of his result in our framework to non-partitional structures is the subject of a companion paper (Tarbush
(2011)).
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denotedM, ω |= ψ, in virtue of the following inductive clauses:
M, ω |= p iff V(p, ω) = 1
M, ω |= ¬ψ iff notM, ω |= ψ
M, ω |= (ψ ∧ φ) iffM, ω |= ψ andM, ω |= φ
M, ω |= iψ iff ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ thenM, ω′ |= ψ
M, ω |= CGψ iff ∀ω′ ∈ Ω accessible from ω in a finite sequence
of Ri (i ∈ G ⊆ N) steps,M, ω′ |= ψ
The truth of formulas involving the other Boolean operators are similarly defined. Fur-
thermore, note that ifM, ω |= CGψ, then one can generate any formula of finite modal
depth of the form ij ...rψ with i, j...r ∈ G, and this formula will be true at ω in
modelM.8
Definition 5 (Component). For any ω ∈ Ω, we will denote the set of all states that are
accessible from ω in a finite sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps, by ΩG(ω). We will call this
set the component of ω.
Definition 6 (Validity). Formula ψ is valid in a modelM, denotedM |= ψ iff ∀ω ∈ Ω in
M, ω |= ψ. Formula ψ is valid in a frame 〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉, denoted 〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉 |= ψ, iff ∀M over
〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉, M |= ψ. Formula ψ is T -valid (or valid), denoted |= ψ, iff ∀〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉 ∈ T
(T , a collection of frames), 〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉 |= ψ.
We can identify collections of frames by the restrictions that we impose on the acces-
sibility relations.
Definition 7 (Conditions on frames). We say that a frame 〈Ω, Ri∈N 〉 is,
Reflexive if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ωRiω
Symmetric if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ then ω′Riω
Transitive if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω, ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ and ω′Riω′′ then ωRiω′′
Euclidean if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω, ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ and ωRiω′′ then ω′Riω′′
Serial if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃ω′ ∈ Ω, ωRiω′
The system S5 consists of all frames that are reflexive, symmetric and transitive; and
the system KD45 consists of all frames that are serial, transitive and Euclidean. The
following formulas are validities in the respective frames, and in fact, the systems can be
axiomatised in the sense that if the validities are assumed then they imply the desired
restrictions on the accessibility relations:
8Note that the definition of the operator CG is drawn from van Benthem (2010), where it is also
mentioned that a more precise definition can be given: One can define a new accessibility relation R∗G
for the whole group G as the reflexive transitive closure of the union of all separate relations Ri (i ∈ G),
and then simply letM, ω |= CGψ if and only if ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, if ωR∗Gω′ thenM, ω′ |= ψ.
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S5 axioms KD45 axioms Axiom names
i(ψ → φ)→ (iψ → iφ) i(ψ → φ)→ (iψ → iφ) Distribution
iψ → ψ iψ → ¬i¬ψ Veracity; Consistency
iψ → iiψ iψ → iiψ Positive introspection
¬iψ → i¬iψ ¬iψ → i¬iψ Negative introspection
It is standard to take the axioms of S5 as describing properties of (a rather strong notion
of) knowledge. Thus, in S5, iψ is interpreted as “agent i knows that ψ". In KD45
however, since veracity is dropped in favour of consistency, we are in a system in which
to “know" that something is the case does not imply that it is true. The axioms of KD45
are thus rather seen as describing properties of a belief operator, so iψ is interpreted as
“agent i believes that ψ". These two systems mirror the patitional and non-partitional
structures mentioned in the introduction.9
Similarly, the operator CGψ is interpreted as “it is common knowledge to all the agents
in G that ψ" in S5, and as “it is common belief to all the agents in G that ψ" in KD45.
3 Models with information and decisions
Let P be the set of all propositions which can describe “facts" about a state. If P is finite,
then its closure under the standard Boolean operators, denoted P ∗, is tautologically
finite.10 Let Ψr0 be the set of all formulas of modal depth 0 up to r for an arbitrary
r ∈ N0. Since P ∗ is finite, so is Ψr0, so |Ψr0| = m, for some m ∈ N; and note that
Ψ00 = P
∗.11
Definition 8 (New operators). For each agent i ∈ N create a set of modal operators,
Oi = {i, ˆi, ˙i}, where for every formula ψ, ˆiψ := i¬ψ and ˙iψ := ¬(iψ ∨ ˆiψ).
The interpretation, for example in S5, is that ˆiψ stands for “agent i knows that it is
not the case that ψ", and ˙iψ stands for “agent i does not know whether it is the case
that ψ". There are similar counterpart interpretations in KD45.
Definition 9 (Kens). Order the set Ψr0 into a vector of length m: (ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψm), and
for each agent i ∈ N , create the sets
Ui = {(ν1i ψ1 ∧ ν2i ψ2 ∧ ... ∧ νmi ψm)|∀n ∈ {1, ...,m}, νni ∈ Oi}
Vi = {νi ∈ Ui| |= ¬(νi ↔ (p ∧ ¬p))}
So, νi ∈ Vi is a ken for agent i, describing i’s information concerning every formula in Ψr0.
So, calling νni ψn the n
th entry of i’s ken, νni ψn states whether i knows that the formula
ψn is the case, or knows that it is not the case, or does not know whether it is the case.
Note that Vi is a restriction of Ui to the set of kens that are not logically equivalent to
a contradiction; so only the logically consistent kens are considered.
9The philosophical grounds for these systems originated in Hintikka (1962), and for an extensive
formal treatment, see Chellas (1980).
10In the sense that there is only a finite number of inequivalent formulas.
11If P = {p, q}, then one can generate 20 inequivalent formulas: 2 from p alone, 2 from q alone and
16 out of p and q together, so |P ∗| = 20.
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The following lemma shows that at each state, there exists a ken for each agent which
holds at that state, and moreover, that any two different kens must be contradictory at
any given state.
Lemma 1. (i) ∀ω ∈ Ω,∃νi ∈ Vi, ω |= νi, (ii) ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀νi, µi ∈ Vi, if νi 6= µi then
ω |= ¬(νi ∧ µi).
By the above lemma, there is a unique ken in Vi that holds at a given state. So for
any νi ∈ Vi, if ω |= νi, we can index the ken by the state, denoting it, ν(ω)i.
Definition 10 (Informativeness). Create an order %⊆ Vi × Vj for all i, j ∈ N . We say
that the ken νi is more informative than the ken µj , denoted νi % µj , if and only if
whenever i knows that ψ then j either also knows that ψ or does not know whether ψ,
and whenever i does not know whether ψ, then so does j.12
Note that % is not a complete order on kens. For example, consider any two kens νi and
µi for agent i, in which the nth entry is νnj ψn = iψn and µnj ψn = ˆiψn. These two kens
would not be comparable with %.
Finally, note that νi ∼ µj denotes νi % µj and µj % νi; which is interpreted as νi
and µj carrying the same information, but seen from the perspectives of agents i and j
respectively.
The infimum of νi and µi, denoted inf{νi, µi}, is the most informative ken that is less
informative than νi and µi.
Lemma 2. For any νi, µi ∈ Vi, inf{νi, µi} exists in Vi and is characterised by:
inf{νi, µi}nψn = iψn iff (νni ψn = µni ψn = iψn)
inf{νi, µi}nψn = ˆiψn iff (νni ψn = µni ψn = ˆiψn)
inf{νi, µi}nψn = ˙iψn iff (νni ψn 6= µni ψn or νni ψn = µni ψn = ˙iψn)
Definition 11 (Decision function). For each i ∈ N , Di : Vi → A, is the decision function
of agent i, where A is a set of actions.
Definition 12 (Action function). For all νi ∈ Vi, |= νi → dDi(νi)i
The action function di selects the action that is actually chosen at each state.13
“Di(νi) = x" is read as “if i’s ken is νi, then i’s decision is to do x", whereas “dxi " is
read as “i performs action x". So although the decision function, Di, determines what
the agent would do over all possible kens, dDi(νi)i is the proposition describing the agent
performing the action that her decision function requires her to take given the ken she
has at each particular state.14
12Formally, (i) if νni ψn = iψn then (µnj ψn = jψn or µnj ψn = ˙jψn), (ii) if νni ψn = ˆiψn then
(µnj ψn = ˆjψn or µnj ψn = ˙jψn), and (iii) if νni ψn = ˙iψn then (µnj ψn = ˙jψn).
13Lemma 1 guarantees that the action function is well-defined.
14Technically, we let all propositions of the form “Di(νi) = x" live in a set D, and all propositions of
the form “dxi " live in a set Q. Then the set of a propositions is P = P ∪D∪Q, so the valuation function
is V : P × Ω→ {0, 1}.
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Definition 13 (Like-mindedness). Agents i and j are like-minded if and only if for all
νi ∈ Vi and νj ∈ Vj , if νi ∼ νj then Di(νi) = Dj(νj); which captures the idea that the
agents would take the same decision if they had the same information.
Definition 14 (Richness). (i) The language in a component ΩG(ω) is said to be rich if
and only if for all i ∈ G and any pair (νi, µi) ∈ {(ν(ω′)i, µ(ω′′)i)|ω′, ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} there
is n ∈ {1, ...,m} such that νni = i and µi = ˆi.
(ii) The language in a component ΩG(ω) is said to be very rich if and only if for all i ∈ G
and any νi ∈ {ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} there is no n ∈ {1, ...,m} such that νni = ˙i.
The interpretation of richness is made clearer in the section below.15
3.1 Main assumptions
We will assume two distinct versions of the Sure-Thing Principle, and prove the theorem
with each respectively. The first will be the analogue of the “non-disjoint" version used
by Moses and Nachum (1990), which we state as a formula, NDSTP , that we assume
to be valid:
Assumption 1 (Non-Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle).
|= NDSTP :=
∧
i∈N
∧
νi,µi∈Vi
[Di(νi) = Di(µi)→ Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(νi)]
The second version is closer to the original one used by Bacharach (1985), which
requires disjointness - which in our framework, is expressed as a restriction on the kens,
related to richness.
Assumption 1’ (Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle).
Let Ti = {(νi, µi) ∈ Vi × Vi|∃n such that νni = i and µni = ˆi},
|= DSTP :=
∧
i∈N
∧
(νi,µi)∈Ti
[Di(νi) = Di(µi)→ Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(νi)]
The above assumptions require discussion.16 Note that NDSTP is clearly stronger
than DSTP . The conceptual differences between these assumptions can be illustrated
with an example.
Suppose i sends out an invitation for a dinner party to Alice, Bob and Charlie, and define
νi to be the ken in which i knows that Alice is coming to the dinner, but does not know
whether Bob is coming to the dinner and does not know whether Charlie is coming to
the dinner (νi = ia ∧ ˙ib ∧ ˙ic). Furthermore, let µi be the ken in which i knows that
Bob is coming to the dinner, but does not know whether Alice is coming to the dinner
15Note that richness is analogous to what we understand as the requirement that all knowledge be
“elementary" in Aumann and Hart (2006); and is intended to capture the idea that the information be
“disjoint" (in line with the Sure-Thing Principle of Bacharach (1985)).
16The above versions of the Sure-Thing Principle are well defined by Lemma 2.
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and does not know whether Charlie is coming to the dinner (µi = ˙ia ∧ ib ∧ ˙ic).
Suppose furthermore, that Di(νi) = Di(µi). The NDSTP would then require that
Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(˙ia ∧ ˙ib ∧ ˙ic) = Di(νi). That is, i must take the same decision
when i does not know anything about whether any guests are coming to the dinner.
The above example illustrates how strong an assumption the NDSTP is: The agent is
required to make the same decision, jumping directly from νi and µi to a situation in
which essentially, nothing is known. But many other kens could have been cycled through
as well, and the same decision would have been required! For example ˙ia ∧ ˙ib ∧ic.
To remedy this, suppose we reformulated the situation as “The agent knows that Alice
sent an RSVP and knows that Bob and Charlie did not". Letting a′ stand for “Alice sent
an RSVP", we have ν ′i = ia′ ∧ ˆib′ ∧ ˆic′. Similarly, we have µ′i = ˆia′ ∧ ib′ ∧ ˆic′.
Now, the pair of kens ν ′′i = νi ∧ ν ′i and µ′′i = µi ∧ µ′i is “rich" in the sense that there is a
proposition, namely a′ for which ia′ in one ken, and ˆia′ in the other. In fact, ν ′′i and
µ′′i include all the information, including all the information about how the information
was acquired, i.e. the “signals" (in the form of propositions regarding whether or not
the guests sent an RSVP). Aumann et al. (2005) argue that in this case, the DSTP is a
reasonable assumption, so if one takes the same decision in the case of ν ′′i and µ
′′
i , then
the same decision must be taken over inf{ν ′′i , µ′′i }.
Note that the pair of kens ν ′i and µ
′
i that only consider information regarding signals,
and discard the rest, are “very rich", in the sense that everything is solely expressed in
terms of “knowing that" or “knowing that not".
Assumption 2 (Like-mindedness). |= ∧νi∈Vi ∧νj∈Vj (νi ∼ νj → Di(νi) = Dj(νj)).
Assumption 3 (State-independent decision functions). The decision function is invari-
ant across all states for each agent. So, for any ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω, if ω′ |= D′i(.) and ω′′ |= D′′i (.),
then ω′ |= D′i(.) = D′′i (.) and ω′′ |= D′i(.) = D′′i (.).17
4 Generalised results in S5
In S5, the accessibility relation Ri is an equivalence relation for each i ∈ N . Let
Ii(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω|ωRiω′} be the information cell of i at ω. One can verify that the
set Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} is a partition of the state space Ω.
We provide a schematic representation of an S5 model in Figure 1. The state space is Ω =
{ω1, ..., ω9}. The partition for agent i is given by the set Ii = {{ω1}, {ω5}, {ω2, ω3}, {ω4, ω7},
{ω6, ω8, ω9}}. Agent j’s partition is found similarly. Furthermore, Ω{i,j}(ω1) = {ω1, ω4, ω7},
and Ω{i,j}(ω2) = Ω\Ω{i,j}(ω1).
The following lemma states that in S5, the information cells of every agent exhaust
any component.
Lemma 3. ∀i ∈ G, ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω′) = ΩG(ω).
17This could equivalently be stated as ν(ω)i ∼ ν(ω′)i → Di(ν(ω)i) = Di(ν(ω′)i).
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Figure 1: State space in S5
The lemma below states that kens are identical across all the states that are in the
same information cell.
Lemma 4. If for some ω′ ∈ Ii(ω), ω′ |= νi, then for all ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω), ω′′ |= νi.
It will now be useful to introduce a new definition which will eventually allow us to
provide a semantic characterisation of inf{νi, µi} for any kens νi, µi ∈ Vi.
Definition 15 (Cell merge). Consider a model in S5, M = 〈Ω, Ri∈N , V 〉. Let Ii(ω) =
{ω′′ ∈ Ω|ωRiω′′} and Ii(ω′) = {ω′′ ∈ Ω|ω′Riω′′}. Create a new modelM(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)) =
〈Ω′, R′i∈N , V ′〉 where,
Ω′ = Ω
R′i = R
′′
i ∪Ri|Ω\Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω′)
where R′′i = {(ω′′, ω′′′) ∈ Ω× Ω|ω′′, ω′′′ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′)}
and Ri|Ω\Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω′) = {(ω′′, ω′′′) ∈ Ri|ω′′, ω′′′ ∈ Ω\Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′)}
R′j = Rj for all j 6= i
V ′ = V
One can verify that the model M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)) is itself a model in S5, but where the
cells Ii(ω) and Ii(ω′) are merged to form a single information cell (with all the accessi-
bility relations appropriately “rewired"), yet leaving the rest of the original model, M,
unchanged.
For sake of illustration, let us return to the example given in Figure 1. Let the model
represented beM. We can, for example, create the “merged" model,M(Ii(ω4), Ii(ω5)),
in which j’s information partition is unchanged, but i’s partition is now {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3},
{ω4, ω5, ω7}, {ω6, ω8, ω9}}.
The following lemmas provides a semantic characterisation of inf{νi, µi} in S5, which
turns out to be the ken that holds in a model in which the information cells, at which νi
and µi hold, are merged.
10
Lemma 5. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0.
If M, ω |= νi and M, ω′ |= µi, then for all ω′′′ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′), M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)), ω′′′ |=
inf{νi, µi}.
Lemma 6. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0 and let G = {i, j}.
For any ΩG(ω), inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
Finally, we are in a position to state our agreement results in S5:
Theorem 1. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, and the system
is S5. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
Theorem 2. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions 1’, 2, 3 hold, the language
is rich in every component, and the system is S5. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |=
CG(d
x
i ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
4.1 Discussion
The intuition behind the results is that each agent has some ken at the actual state ω,
and based on this ken, say ν(ω)i, the agent actually takes the action dxi . However, the
Sure-Thing Principle allows us to discover that i’s decision would also be x if i’s infor-
mation were inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. This is not the ken that i has ω, so i’s action is
not taken based on this ken. However, responding to Moses and Nachum (1990), it has
a clear interpretation: It is the most informative ken that is less informative than any
ken that i has at any state in the common knowledge component; and if this were i’s
ken, then i’s decision would be x. However, over a similar ken, we find that j’s decision
would be y. But since this is the same uninformative ken, and agents are like-minded,
we conclude that x = y.
Note the role of the infimum of kens in the theorems: Effectively, it only preserves those
propositions that both agents know. Any proposition p where i knows that p while j
knows that ¬p, or where i knows that p and j does not know whether p is discarded.
That is, implicitly, the only information that becomes relevant for the decisions of the
agents is the information on which they already agree.
Theorem 1 in particular, highlights an awkwardness of the agreement results: If we
require the weaker version of the Sure-Thing Principle to hold (DSTP ), then whether
or not the agreement theorem holds depends on the richness of the language. In other
words, it depends on the way in which the environment is described!
We should note that in S5, if we assume the language to be very rich in some component,
this has the remarkable implication that both agents must have the same information at
every state of the component.
Proposition 1. Suppose the language is very rich in some component ΩG(ω). Then, for
all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= νi ∼ µj.
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A direct corollary of this is that agents cannot agree to disagree if they are like-
minded, even if the decision functions do not satisfy any version of the Sure-Thing Prin-
ciple.
Theorem 3. Suppose assumption 2 and the language is very rich in every component,
and the system is S5. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
The discussion of this theorem is similar to the one provided for Theorem 8 below.
Regarding both theorems, it should be noted that they are stated with global as-
sumptions, but local assumptions would have sufficed: We could have required that the
assumed validities hold true at each state of the component rather than at every state
of the state space. Furthermore, both rely on the restriction that only Ψr0 with r = 0 be
considered (that is, Ψ00 = P ∗). This means that decisions cannot be based on formulas
involving nested modal operators; that is, on interactive information.18 This is analogous
to the assumption made in Aumann and Hart (2006) that decisions be substantive: “Only
knowledge of elementary facts matters, not knowledge about knowledge (i.e. interactive
knowledge)".19 The reason for this restriction is that Lemma 5 does not hold for Ψr0 if
r > 0. This is because the truth of formulas of a modal depth one or greater is fully
determined by the accessibility relations of all agents. The trouble is that by moving
from the modelM to a merged modelM(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)), we are modifying the accessibil-
ity relations, and there is no guarantee that truth of higher depth formulas will remain
unchanged, so kens in the merged model may be incomparable (via %) with the kens in
the original model.
Figure 2 provides a counter-example to Lemma 5 when r > 0: Suppose that in both
models, ω |= p and ω′ |= ¬p. One can verify that for all ω ∈ Ω, M, ω |= iˆj˙ip, and
M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)), ω |= ˆiˆj˙ip. Therefore, whatever ken i might have in the merged
model, it is incomparable (via %) with her kens in the original model.
Of course, the upshot of this is that, given our other assumptions, agents can agree to
disagree if their decision functions are allowed to depend on interactive information.
Finally in S5, we can show that our framework can be mapped directly into that of
Bacharach (1985) while explicitly showing where Bahcarach’s framework becomes inco-
herent, and is essentially identical to that of Aumann and Hart (2006) (see Appendix B).
18Note: Tarbush (2011) finds that a distinguishing feature of the agreement result in Samet (2010) is
that it holds for all r ≥ 0.
19This avoids the criticism of Moses and Nachum (1990) concerning the like-mindedness assumption.
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However, the framework developed here has some advantages: (i) The use of epistemic
logic allows for a very transparent account of the conditions on the modal depth of for-
mulas, (ii) the ordering % on kens gives a clear definition of informativeness, and hence
of inf{νi, µi}, (iii) explicitly modelling the accessibility relations between states allows
us to easily consider extensions in a non-partitional state space, and finally (iv) our ap-
proach allows us to unify and compare the results of the literature in one methodological
approach.
5 Generalised result in KD45
We can now analyse the consequences of using a model for belief rather than knowledge.
So we impose a KD45 frame rather than an S5 frame.
Essentially, the only difference between knowledge and belief that we will consider is
that belief is not infallible. In S5, agents cannot know something that is false, be-
cause reflexivity implies that if one knows that p at some state, then p must be true
at that state (Veracity). On the other hand, KD45 allows agents to believe what is
false, and thus to base decision on false information, by dropping reflexivity. In fact,
S5 = KD45 + reflexivity.
We can provide a description of the links between states in a KD45 frame: Some
sets of states within Ω are “completely connected", in the sense that the accessibility
relation over states within such sets in an equivalence relation, so these sets have the same
properties as information cells in S5; and, for each one of these completely connected
sets there exists a (possibly empty) set of “associated" states that have arrows pointing
from them to every state in the completely connected set, but with no arrow (by the
same agent) pointing towards them. The set of all completely connected sets and their
set of associated states exhaust the state space.
Formally, let Si(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω|ωEiω′}, where Ei is an equivalence relation. We call this
set of completely connected states the information sink of state ω for player i. Note, that
this way of defining the sink guarantees that if Si(ω) 6= ∅ then ω ∈ Si(ω). Furthermore,
we define ω’s set of associated states as Ai(ω) = {ω′′ ∈ Ω|∀ω′′′ ∈ Si(ω), ω′′Fiω′′′}, where
Fi is now a simple arrow. So, note that now, for any agent i, we have that Ri = Ei ∪Fi.
Finally, we can define Ji(ω) = Si(ω)∪Ai(ω), and note that Ji = {Ji(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} exhausts
the entire state space.
Proposition 2. The above is a complete characterisation of the KD45 state space.
We provide a schematic representation of a KD45 model in Figure 3. For example,
i’s information sink at state ω4 is the set Si(ω4) = {ω4, ω5}, and the set of associated
states is Ai(ω4) = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Furthermore, note for example that the component of
state ω1 is the set Ω{i,j}(ω1) = Ω\{ω1, ω7}, so it is now possible that ω 6∈ ΩG(ω).
We will need to add the following assumptions to derive the main results:
13
ω1
?
??
??
??
??
??

ω2
 





ω3
 





wwooo
ooo
ooo
ooo
ooo
ooo
ω4 oo //RR ω5LL ω6

ω7
77oooooooooooooooooo
66ω8 //
??
ω9

OO
kk
'& %$
 ! "#
ω1

ω2 oo //33 ω3 kkOO

ω4 kk ω5
OO
//
??
ω6 kk

__???????????
ω7 kk ω8 oo //33 ω9 kk
'& %$
 ! "#
Agent i Agent j
Figure 3: State space in KD45
Assumption 4 (Heterogeneity). If for all i ∈ G, and for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω′)i = ν(ω)i,
then for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω′)i ∼ ν(ω′)j.
Purely syntactically, this can be stated as: |= CG(νi ∧ µj)→ CG(νi ∼ µj).
This assumption is termed “heterogeneity" because it is equivalent to the statement:
Either for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω′)j ∼ ν(ω′)j ; or, there exists an i ∈ G such that ν(ω′)i 6=
ν(ω)i for some ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω). That is, in any component, either the agents have the same
information, or at least one of the agents has different information at a different state in
the component.
Assumption 5 (Veracity of actions). For all i ∈ N and all x ∈ A, if for some ω′ ∈ Ji(ω),
ω′ |= dxi , then for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω), ω′′ |= dxi .
The above states that if an agent performs action x, then her performing x must be
the case at every state of Ji(ω). In other words, if an agent believes she performs an
action at a state then that action must indeed be performed at the state, even if she
considers the state epistemically impossible.20
The following lemmas are generalisations of the ones found for S5.
Lemma 7. ∀i ∈ G, ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω′) ⊆ ΩG(ω) ⊆ ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω′).
Lemma 8. If for some ω′ ∈ Ji(ω), ω′ |= νi, then for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω), ω′′ |= νi.
Definition 16 (Sink merge). Consider a model in KD45, M = 〈Ω, Ri∈N , V 〉. Let
Ji(ω) = Si(ω)∪Ai(ω) and Ji(ω′) = Si(ω′)∪Ai(ω′). Create a new modelM(Ji(ω), Ji(ω′)) =
20This condition is reminiscent of an assumption made in Aumann (1987): “A player always knows
what decision he himself takes" (own emphasis). It equivalently be expressed as: For all z ∈ Q, if for
some ω′ ∈ Ji(ω), V(z, ω′) = 1, then for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω), V(z, ω′′) = 1.
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〈Ω′, R′i∈N , V ′〉 where,
Ω′ = Ω
R′i = E
′
i ∪ F ′i
E′i = E
′′
i ∪ Ei|Ω\Si(ω)∪Si(ω′)
where E′′i = {(ω′′, ω′′′) ∈ Ω× Ω|ω′′, ω′′′ ∈ Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω′)}
and Ei|Ω\Si(ω)∪Si(ω′) = {(ω′′, ω′′′) ∈ Ei|ω′′, ω′′′ ∈ Ω\Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω′)}
F ′i = F
′′
i ∪ Fi|Ω\Ai(ω)∪Ai(ω′)
where F ′′i = {(ω′′, ω′′′) ∈ Ω× Ω|ω′′ ∈ Ai(ω) ∪Ai(ω′), ω′′′ ∈ Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω′)}
and Fi|Ω\Ai(ω)∪Ai(ω′) = {(ω′′, ω′′′) ∈ Fi|ω′′, ω′′′ ∈ Ω\Ai(ω) ∪Ai(ω′)}
R′j = Rj for all j 6= i
V ′ = V
One can verify that the model M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω′)) is itself a model in KD45, but where
Ji(ω) and Ji(ω′) are merged to form a new information sink with a set of associated
states, yet leaving the rest of the original model,M, unchanged.
For sake of illustration, let us return to the example given in Figure 3. Let the model
represented beM. We can, for example, create the “merged" model,M(Jj(ω1), Jj(ω8)),
in which i’s accessibility relation is unchanged, but j now has a sink Si(ω8) = {ω4, ω8, ω9}
and a set of associated states Aj(ω8) = {ω1}. That is, there is an equivalence relation
over the states in Si(ω8), and there are arrows from ω1 pointing to each of the states
in Si(ω8); and, the relations between the rest of the states remain as they were in the
original model for j.
Lemma 9. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0.
If M, ω |= νi and M, ω′ |= µi, then for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω) ∪ Ji(ω′), M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω′)), ω′′ |=
inf{νi, µi}.
Lemma 10. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0.
Let G = {i, j}. For any ΩG(ω), inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
We can now state our generalised agreement results in KD45.
Theorem 4. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 hold, and the
system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
Theorem 5. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions 1’, 2, 3, 4, 5 hold, the
language is rich in every component, and the system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N .
Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
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5.1 Discussion
Both theorems now require the “veracity of actions" and some form of heterogeneity.21
The reason we must assume the former is that although the agents may commonly believe
that their chosen actions are x and y at ω, in KD45, it may not be true that their chosen
actions are x and y at ω. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that, when it concerns
actions, agents at least are not wrong about what they are themselves doing. Note that,
trivially, this assumption always holds in an S5 model. Furthermore, note that without
this assumption, one could still derive some version of the agreement result in which the
agents end up believing that their actions are identical, although they may not in fact
be, as shown in the theorem below.
Theorem 6. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions (EITHER 1 OR 1’ and the
language is rich in every component), 2, 3 and 4 hold, and the system is KD45. Let
G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ i(x = y) ∧j(x = y).
Heterogeneity requires that at least some agent has some variation in her information
in the set ΩS(ω) (or that the agents’ information be the same). Note that the assumption
is always satisfied in an S5 model.
Proposition 3. Let the system be S5 and G = {i, j}. If for all i ∈ G, and for all
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω′)i = ν(ω)i, then for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω′)i ∼ ν(ω′)j.
We construct a model in which heterogeneity fails (where both agents have no varia-
tion in their information), and show that the agents can agree to disagree. Consider the
model represented in Figure 4 and suppose that ω |= p, and ω′ |= ¬p. In this model, at
every state, i believes that p is the case, whereas j believes that ¬p is the case. So we
can let i’s decision at every state be x while letting j’s be y.
An interpretation of this example is that the agents are systematically biased in the way
they acquire new information. For example, suppose Alice and Bob have a decision func-
tion whereby they leave the country if they believe that taxes will rise after the election,
and stay if they believe that taxes stay the same. Now, suppose that in state ω, Alice
consults one expert, and in ω′, she consults another, but both experts tell her that taxes
will rise; so Alice would always come to believe that taxes will rise, so she decides to
leave the country. On the other hand, in state ω, Bob consults one expert, and another
21Note that as in S5, it could have also been possible to reduce all the assumptions from holding
globally to holding locally, at the common belief component level only.
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in ω′, but in both cases, he is told that taxes will not rise, so he always comes to believe
that they will not rise, and thus decides to stay.
Now, even though it is the case that Bob knows that Alice will leave the country, and
he knows that she has the same decision function as he does, he cannot “update" his
decision when he is given the information about her decision, because there is simply no
other information that he deems it is possible to acquire.
5.1.1 A taxonomy of conditions
In this section, we contrast and compare various conditions that have been used in the
literature in relation to agreement theorems. This will allow us to place heterogeneity
in relation to more familiar conditions, and also to provide a discussion of the richness
assumption in KD45.
Each condition will be given semantically (a), and syntactically when possible (b).
Definition 17 (Condition 1). Condition (1.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists
an ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω′) = Sj(ω′). Condition (1.b): |= ¬CG¬(νi ∼ µj).
Definition 18 (Condition 2). Condition (2.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists an
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω′) ⊆ Sj(ω′). Condition (2.b): |= ¬CG¬(νi % µj)∧¬CG¬(µj %
νi).
Condition 1 states that in any component, there must exist a state in which both
agents have the same ken, while condition 2 states that in any component, a state must
exist in which i’s ken is more informative than j’s, and a state must exist in which j’s
ken is more informative than i’s.
Definition 19 (Condition 3). Condition (3.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists
an ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ∪ω′′∈ΩG(ω′)Si(ω′′) = ∪ω′′∈ΩG(ω′)Sj(ω′′). Condition (3.b): |=
¬CG¬CG(
∧
n∈{1,...,m}
∧
i∈Giψn → ψn).
Definition 20 (Condition 4). Condition (4.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists
an ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω′) ⊆ ∪ω′′∈ΩG(ω)Sj(ω′′). Condition (4.b): |= CG(νi ∧ µj)→
CG(νi ∼ µj).
Condition 3 and 4 are clearly weaker counterparts of conditions 1 and 2 respectively.
Their direct interpretation is not obvious. However, their syntactic implications are
interpretable: Condition (3.b) is what Bonanno and Nehring (1998) term quasi-coherence:
“agents consider it jointly possible that they commonly believe that what they believe
is true". They show that it is equivalent to the impossibility of unbounded gains from
betting (with moderately risk averse agents), which gives it normative appeal. Condition
(4.b) is simply heterogeneity: “if agents’ beliefs (kens) are commonly believed, then their
beliefs (kens) must be the same".
Definition 21 (Condition 5). Condition (5.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists an
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω′) ∩ Sj(ω′) 6= ∅. Condition (5.b): |= ¬CG(
∨
n∈{1,...,m}(iψn ∧
ˆjψn)).
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This condition states that it cannot be the case that all the information sinks are
disjoint across agents. Obviously, imposing such a condition would rule out the scenario
represented in Figure 4.
Proposition 4. The arrows (⇒) represent logical implication in Figure 5.
Notably, it is shown that quasi-coherence implies heterogeneity. However, the con-
verse does not hold, as shown in Figure 6. Suppose that ω |= p, ω′ |= p and ω′′ |= ¬p.
Clearly, there is a state, namely ω′′ in ΩG(ω) at which (ω′′, ω′′) 6∈ Ri so quasi-coherence
fails. However, at ω |= jp whereas ω′′ |= ˙jp so heterogeneity holds.
On the other hand, there is no implication in either direction between heterogeneity
and condition (5.b). In the model on the left in Figure 7, let ω |= p, ω′ |= ¬p and ω′′ |= p.
It is easy to see that condition (5.b) holds since the sinks intersect at ω. However, ip
holds at every state while ˙jp holds at every state, so heterogeneity fails. However, in
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Figure 7: Condition (5.b) holds and heterogeneity fails (left); Heterogeneity holds and
(5.b) fails (right)
the model on the right, let ω |= p ∧ q, ω′ |= ¬q ∧ ¬p, ω′′ |= q ∧ ¬p and ω′′′ |= p ∧ ¬q.
One can verify that at every state, there exists a proposition ψ such that iψ ∧ ˆjψ, so
(5.b) fails. However, there is variation in the agents’ kens across states, so heterogeneity
holds.
It is interesting to note that the difficulty in fully characterising heterogeneity only
in terms of sets of states and accessibility relations can be seen as offering vindication to
the approach adopted in this paper: We can say more when we also explicitly consider
the truth or falsity of propositions at every state.
The upshot of our analysis is that if one is prepared to accept the assumptions for the
results in S5, then it is only a small step to also accept the results in KD45 - without
having to resort to anything as strong as the Zero-Priors assumption.
In contrast with S5, assuming that the language is very rich does not imply that the
agents have the same information at every state of every component. However, it does
nevertheless yield striking results.
Proposition 5. Suppose the language is very rich in some component ΩG(ω). Then,
condition (5.b) implies (1.b).
The implication of this proposition is that (5.b) together with a very rich language
imply heterogeneity. Therefore, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 7. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions 1’, 2, 3, 5 and condition
(5.b) hold, the language is very rich, and the system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N .
Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
5.2 Agreement without the Sure-Thing Principle
Here, we present here a theorem, similar to Theorem 3, which does not restrict the deci-
sion functions to satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle. Firstly, reasonable decision functions
that violate the principle may arguably exist, and secondly, such a theorem determines
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the conditions under which there is agreement even when the principle is violated be-
haviourally (which is common, as surveyed in Shafir (1994)).
Theorem 8. Suppose assumption 2 and condition (1.b) hold, and the system is KD45.
Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
This result has several striking features: Firstly, it does not assume anything about
the decision functions, other than the requirement of like-mindedness. Therefore, this
theorem applies to all decision functions, including the ones that do not satisfy the Sure-
Thing Principle. Secondly, it makes no requirement on the richness of the language.
Thirdly, it does not require any restriction on r, the modal depth of formulas. This
means that decisions can be based on interactive information. That is, formulas of the
form: i believes that j believes that p. Finally, it does not require decision functions
to be independent of states, which implies that the theorem holds even if the decision
functions themselves are not commonly believed.
Of course, the main driver here is condition (1.b), which states that it must be commonly
possible for the agents to have the same information. Note that this condition has the
same effect as assuming a very rich language in S5; namely, it implies that the agents
have the same information at the same states in every component. However, this is not
the case in KD45.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, and suppose that
ω |= ψ, for some formula ψ ∈ Ψr0. It must be the case that either (i.a) ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′
then ω′ |= ψ, or (i.b) ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω′ then ω′ |= ¬ψ, or (i.c) ∃ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω, such that
ωRiω
′ and ωRiω′′, and ω′ |= ψ and ω′′ |= ¬ψ (i.e. neither (i.a) nor (i.b)).
If (i.a) is the case, then ω |= iψ. If (i.b) is the case, then ω |= ˆiψ, and finally, if (i.c)
is the case, then ω |= ˙iψ. Therefore, in all cases, the operator over ψ belongs to the set
Oi, and since this holds for any ψ ∈ Ψr0, it holds for each entry of a ken. Furthermore,
|= can only generate consistent lists of formulas, so kens cannot be inconsistent. This
implies that a ken must exist that belongs to Vi.
(ii) Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Let νi, µi ∈ Vi, and consider the nth entry of
each ken such that νni ψn 6= µni ψn. Case (ii.a): Suppose ω |= νni ψn = iψn. So, ∀ω′ ∈ Ω,
if ωRiω′, then ω′ |= ψn. By definition, this rules out the possibility that also, ω |= ˆiψn,
or ω |= ˙iψn. For cases (ii.b), ω |= νni ψn = ˆiψn, and (ii.c), ω |= νni ψn = ˙iψn, proceed
analogously to (ii.a).
Proof of Lemma 2 For ease of notation, let inf{νi, µi} = ηi.
(a) Suppose νni ψn = µ
n
i ψn = iψn. Then, if νi % ηi and µi % ηi, it must be the
case that ηni ψn = iψn or ηni ψn = ˙iψn. However, if the latter, then ηi would not
be maximal in the set {ηi ∈ Vi|νi % ηi and µi % ηi}. Therefore, ηni ψn = iψn. Con-
versely, suppose ηni ψn = iψn. Furthermore, suppose, without loss of generality that
µni ψn = ˆiψn or µni ψn = ˙iψn. In the former case, ηi and µi would not be comparable,
and in the latter case, ηi would be more informative than µi on that entry. Therefore,
in either case, ηi would not belong to the set {ηi ∈ Vi|νi % ηi and µi % ηi}. Therefore,
νni ψn = µ
n
i ψn = iψn. Proving cases (b), ηni ψn = ˆiψn iff (νni ψn = µni ψn = ˆiψn) and
(c), ηni ψn = ˙iψn iff (νni ψn 6= µni ψn or νni ψn = µni ψn = ˙iψn) can be done analogously
to case (a).
Finally, suppose |= ηi ↔ (p ∧ ¬p). Then, there exist n and n′ such that ηni ψn ↔
¬ηn′i ψn′ . But ηni is essentially generated by the conjunction of νni and µni . So, we
have (νni ψn ∧ µni ψn) ↔ ¬(νn
′
i ψn′ ∧ µn
′
i ψn′). But this implies that ν
n
i ψn ↔ ¬νn
′
i ψn′ or
µni ψn ↔ ¬µn
′
i ψn′ . That is, ηi is not in Vi if νi or µi are not in Vi. Therefore, ηi ∈ Vi.
Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose ω′′ ∈ ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω′). So, ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω′) for some
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω). But, ω′Riω′′, and there exists a sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps such that ω′
is reachable from ω. Therefore, there exists a sequence, one step longer, such that ω′′ is
reachable from ω. So, ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω). (And, note that Ii(ω′′) ⊆ ΩG(ω)).
Suppose ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω). Reflexivity guarantees that ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω′′). So, for some ω∗ ∈ ΩG(ω),
ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω∗), so ω′′ ∈
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
′).
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose ω′ |= νi for some ω′ ∈ Ii(ω). Consider the nth entry of
the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(a) Suppose ω′ |= νni ψn = iψn. Then, for all ω′′ ∈ Ω, ω′Riω′′ implies ω′′ |= ψn. So,
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for all ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω′), ω′′ |= ψn. But since Ri is an equivalence relation, and ω′ ∈ Ii(ω), it
follows that Ii(ω′) = Ii(ω). So, for all ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω), ω′′ |= ψn, from which it follows that
for all ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω), ω′′ |= iψn.
Case (b), ω′ |= νni ψn = ˆiψn and (c), ω′ |= νni ψn = ˙iψn are analogous to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 5 Suppose that for all ω′ ∈ Ii(ω), M, ω′ |= νi and for all
ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω′), M, ω′′ |= µi. Consider the nth entry of each of these kens, which are
only defined for formulas in Ψ00.
Case (a): Suppose that νni pn = µ
n
i pn = ipn, then for all ω′′′ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′), ω′′′ |= pn,
and therefore, for all ω′′′ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω′),M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)), ω′′′ |= inf{νi, µi}npn = ipn.
Case (b), νni pn = µ
n
i ψn = ˆipn, and (c) (νni pn 6= µni pn or νni pn = µni pn = ˙ipn) are
treated analogously to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 6 By Lemma 1, for each ω′ ∈ Ω, there is a ken that holds at ω′.
That is, ω′ |= ν(ω′)i. By Lemma 4, we have that for all ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω′), ω′′ |= ν(ω′)i. Now,
consider the set of kens {ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
′)}. By Lemma 5, it follows that for all
ω′′ ∈ ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω′),M({Ii(ω′)|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}), ω′′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω′)}.
By Lemma 3, for all ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω),M({Ii(ω′)|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}), ω′′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
So, in the model in which i’s information cell is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving j’s partition un-
changed, inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state in ΩG(ω). Reasoning similarly for
agent j, in the model in which j’s information cell is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving i’s partition
unchanged, inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state in ΩG(ω). However, since r = 0,
an agent i’s ken only depends on i’s accessibility relation (higher depth nested formulas
are ignored). So, inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} and inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} hold at every state
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) of a model M∗ in which all the set Ii(ω′) are “merged" and all the sets
Ij(ω
′) are merged. But ∪ω′∈ΩG(ω)Ii(ω′) = ∪ω′∈ΩG(ω)Ij(ω′) = ΩG(ω). That is, the agents
have the same information cell in M∗. Trivially, it follows that for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω),
M∗, ω′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose r = 0, so Ψ00 = P ∗ and that assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold,
and the system is S5. Arbitrarily choose ω ∈ Ω, and consider the set ΩG(ω). Consider
the sets of kens ν(ω)i ∈ Vi and ν(ω)j ∈ Vi, for all ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma 1 part (i), we have
that ω |= ν(ω)i∧ν(ω)j . Using the action function we have that ω |= dDi(ν(ω)i)i ∧dDj(ν(ω)j)j .
Now, suppose that ω |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ). By definition, ∀ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′′ |= dxi ∧ dyj . There-
fore, notably, since ω ∈ ΩG(ω), we have that ω |= Di(ν(ω)i) = x ∧ Dj(ν(ω)j) = y. It
remains to show that ω |= (x = y).
By Assumption 3, the decision functions are the same across states, so we can apply
Assumption 1 to obtain that for all ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′′ |= Di(inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = x.
Since ω ∈ ΩG(ω), we have that ω |= Di(inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = x. By a similar
argument, one can show that ω |= Dj(inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = y.
By Lemma 6, inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. So, by Assumption 2,
it follows that ω |= (x = y).
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Proof of Theorem 2 Repeat the proof of Theorem 1, replacing Assumption 1 with
1’.
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider an arbitrary ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), and suppose ω′ |= iψn.
Then ω′ |= ψn by reflexivity of Ri. But by reflexivity of Rj at ω′, this implies that
ω′ |= jψn∧ ˙jψn. But if the language is very rich, the only possible case is ω′ |= jψn.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let “i-arrow" refer to an arrow of i’s accessibility relation.
Firstly, we can show that Ri = Ei∪Fi. An arbitrary ω ∈ Ω either has an i-arrow pointing
to it or it does not. If it does not, by seriality, it points to another state. If it does, then
there exists a state ω′ that points to ω which itself points to some state ω′′ by seriality.
Transitivity implies that ω′ points to ω′′ and Euclideaness implies that ω′′ points to ω.
From here it is easy to prove that ω, ω′ and ω′′ are in an equivalence class.
Secondly, we show that if Ji(ω′) 6= Ji(ω′′) then Ji(ω′) ∩ Ji(ω′′) = ∅. Suppose ω ∈
Ji(ω
′) ∩ Ji(ω′′). If ω ∈ Si(ω′) ∩ Si(ω′′) then Si(ω′) and Si(ω′′) are indistinguishable,
and one can verify that Ji(ω′) = Ji(ω′′). If ω ∈ Si(ω′) ∩ Ai(ω′′) then ω both does have
and does not have an i-arrow pointing to it. Finally, if ω ∈ Ai(ω′) ∩ Ai(ω′′) then by
Euclideaness, ω′ and ω′′ are indistinguishable, and Ji(ω′) = Ji(ω′′).
Thirdly, we can show that ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω) = Ω. Suppose ω′ ∈ ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω), then by the def-
initions of Si and Ai, ω′ ∈ Ω. On the other hand, suppose ω ∈ Ω. Then if there is an
i-arrow pointing to ω, ω ∈ Si(ω) ⊆ Ji(ω). If there is no i-arrow pointing to it, then by
seriality, there is an ω′ that ω points to, so ω ∈ Ai(ω′) ⊆ Ji(ω′). So, ω ∈ ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω).
Proof of Lemma 7 Suppose ω′′ ∈ ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω′). So, ω′′ ∈ Si(ω′) for some
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω). But, ω′Eiω′′, and there exists a sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps such that ω′
is reachable from ω. Therefore, there exists a sequence, one step longer, such that ω′′ is
reachable from ω. So, ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω).
Suppose ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω). Either ω′′ has an i-arrow pointing towards it, in which case
ω′′ ∈ Si(ω′′). So, ω′′ ∈ Si(ω′′)∪Ai(ω′′) = Ji(ω′′), or, ω′′ has no i-arrow pointing towards
it, in which case, by seriality, there exists some ω′′′ such that ω′′ ∈ Ai(ω′′′). Note that
ω′′′ must be in ΩG(ω) since it is reachable from ω′′. So, ω′′ ∈ Si(ω′′′)∪Ai(ω′′′) = Ji(ω′′′).
In either case, for some ω∗ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω∗), so ω′′ ∈
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′).
Proof of Lemma 8 Suppose ω′ |= νi for some ω′ ∈ Ji(ω). Firstly, suppose
ω′ ∈ Si(ω), and consider the nth entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(a) Suppose ω′ |= νni ψn = iψn. Then, for all ω′′ ∈ Ω, ω′Eiω′′ implies ω′′ |= ψn. So,
for all ω′′ ∈ Si(ω′), ω′′ |= ψn. But since Ei is an equivalence relation, and ω′ ∈ Si(ω),
it follows that Si(ω′) = Si(ω). So, for all ω′′ ∈ Si(ω), ω′′ |= ψn, from which it follows
that for all ω′′ ∈ Si(ω), ω′′ |= iψn. Also, each ω′′′ ∈ Ai(ω) has an arrow pointing to
each state in Si(ω), so for all ω∗ ∈ Si(ω), if ω′′′Fiω∗, ω∗ |= ψn. So, for all ω′′′ ∈ Ai(ω),
ω′′′ |= iψn. It follows that for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω), ω′′ |= iψn.
Case (b), ω′ |= νni ψn = ˆiψn and (c), ω′ |= νni ψn = ˙iψn are analogous to case (a).
Now, suppose ω′ ∈ Ai(ω), and consider the nth entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
23
(d) Suppose ω′ |= νni ψn = iψn. Then, for all ω′′ ∈ Ω, ω′Fiω′′ implies ω′′ |= ψn.
So, for all ω′′ ∈ Si(ω′), ω′′ |= ψn. This implies that ω′′ |= iψn for all ω′′ ∈ Si(ω),
and ω′′′ |= iψn for all other states ω′′′ ∈ Ai(ω). It follows that for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω),
ω′′ |= iψn.
Case (e), ω′ |= νni ψn = ˆiψn and (f), ω′ |= νni ψn = ˙iψn are analogous to case (d).
Proof of Lemma 9 Suppose that for all ω ∈ Ji(ω),M, ω |= νi and for all ω′ ∈ Ji(ω′),
M, ω′ |= µi. Consider the nth entry of each of these kens, defined only for formulas in
Ψ00.
Case (a): Suppose that νni pn = µ
n
i pn = ipn, then for all ω′′ ∈ Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω′),
ω′′ |= pn, and therefore, following the proof of Lemma 8, for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω) ∪ Ji(ω′),
M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω′)), ω′′ |= inf{νi, µi}npn = ipn.
Case (b), νni pn = µ
n
i ψn = ˆipn, and (c) (νni pn 6= µni pn or νni pn = µni pn = ˙ipn) are
treated analogously to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 10 By Lemma 1, for each ω′ ∈ Ω, there is a ken that holds at
ω′. That is, ω′ |= ν(ω′)i. By Lemma 8, we have that for all ω′′ ∈ Ji(ω′), ω′′ |= ν(ω′)i.
Now, consider the set of kens {ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′)}. By Lemma 9, it fol-
lows that for all ω′′ ∈ ⋃ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω′), M({Ji(ω′)|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}), ω′′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′)}.
By Lemma 7, since ΩG(ω) ⊆
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′), it follows that for all ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω), we have
thatM({Ji(ω′)|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}), ω′′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′)}. Furthermore, the
kens that hold in states (
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′))\ΩG(ω) must be identical to the ones that hold
at the states in ΩG(ω), because all the states in the former set must be associated states,
and thus the information that holds at them must be the same as the information that
holds true in their respective information sinks, which are contained in ΩG(ω). Therefore,
inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
′)} = inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. It follows therefore, that for
all ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω), we have that M({Ji(ω′)|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}), ω′′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
So, in the model in which i’s information sink plus associated states is equal to ΩG(ω),
leaving j’s accessibility relation unchanged, inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state
in ΩG(ω). Reasoning similarly for agent j, in the model in which j’s information sink
plus associated states is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving i’s accessibility relation unchanged,
inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state in ΩG(ω).22
Now, since r = 0, an agent i’s ken only depends on i’s accessibility relation (higher depth
nested formulas are ignored). So, inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} and inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}
hold at every state ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) of a modelM∗ in which all the set Si(ω′) are “merged" and
all the sets Sj(ω′) are merged. Now, by Assumption 4, it follows that for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω),
M∗, ω′ |= inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.23
22Note that the set ΩG(ω) does not change as a result of the sink merge operation: No state in ΩG(ω)
becomes connected to a state outside the set, and states within the set can only gain connections, never
lose any.
23We require Assumption 4 since there is no guarantee that ∪ω′∈ΩG(ω)Si(ω′) = ∪ω′∈ΩG(ω)Sj(ω′), and
an agent i’s ken essentially depends only on the sets Si.
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Proof of Theorem 4 Suppose we restrict ourselves to Ψ00 and that assumptions 1,
2, 3, 4, 5 hold, and the system is KD45. Arbitrarily choose ω ∈ Ω, and consider the set
ΩG(ω). Consider the sets of kens ν(ω)i ∈ Vi and ν(ω)j ∈ Vi, for all ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma
1 part (i), we have that ω |= ν(ω)i ∧ ν(ω)j . And, by the action function, we have that
ω |= dDi(ν(ω)i)i ∧ dDj(ν(ω)j)j . Now, suppose that ω |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ). By definition, ∀ω′′ ∈
ΩG(ω), ω′′ |= dxi ∧ dyj . Therefore, ∀ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′′ |= Di(ν(ω′′)i) = x ∧Dj(ν(ω′′)j) = y.
Furthermore, ω |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ) implies that ω |= i(dxi )∧j(dyj ), and by Assumption 5,
ω |= (dxi ∧ dyj ), so we also have ω |= Di(ν(ω)i) = x ∧Dj(ν(ω)j) = y. It remains to show
that ω |= (x = y).
By Assumption 3, the decision functions are the same across states, so we can apply
Assumption 1 to obtain that for all ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′′ |= Di(inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = x.
By a similar argument, one can show that ω |= Dj(inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = y.
By Lemma 10, inf{ν(ω′)i|ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω′)j |ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. So, by Assumption 2,
it follows that ω |= (x = y).
Proof of Theorem 5 Repeat proof of Theorem 4, replacing Assumption 1 with 1’.
Proof of Theorem 6 Repeat proof of Theorem 4, however we can now only show
that for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), (which could exclude ω itself), ω′ |= (x = y). Therefore,
ω |= i(x = y) ∧j(x = y).
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that for every ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)i. Consider
the nth entry of the kens.
Case (a): Suppose that ∀ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)ni ψn = iψn. Then, for all ω′′ ∈ Ii(ω′),
ω′′ |= ψn. But, by Lemma 3, since
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
′) = ΩG(ω), it follows that for all
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ψn.
Furthermore, by Lemma 3,
⋃
ω′∈ΩG(ω) Ij(ω
′) = ΩG(ω). Therefore, no matter what infor-
mation cell j might be in, ψn will be true at each state in that information cell. Therefore
∀ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= jψn. That is, the nth entry of the kens carry the same information.
Case (b): ∀ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)ni ψn = ˆiψn is treated analogously to case (a).
Case (c): Suppose that ∀ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)ni ψn = ˙iψn. Then, there exists ω′′ and
ω′′′ with ω′Riω′′ and ω′Riω′′′, such that ω′′ |= ψn and ω′′′ |= ¬ψn. It follows that there
exists ω′′, ω′′′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ω′′ |= ψn and ω′′′ |= ¬ψn. Now, suppose that for all
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)nj ψn = jψn or that for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)nj ψn = ˆjψn.
If for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= jψn, then (as above) for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ψn, which
contradicts the fact that ω′′′ |= ¬ψn. Similarly, if for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ˆjψn, then
(as above) for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ¬ψn, which contradicts the fact that ω′′ |= ψn.
Therefore, ∀ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ˙jψn.
Since the above cases exhaust every possibility of an entry in a ken, and since the entry
was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= ν(ω)i ∼ ν(ω)j .
Proof of Proposition 4 The implications among the conditions expressed seman-
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tically are simple.
Now, we can show that for any ω ∈ Ω such that Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω), if ω |= νi ∧ νj then
ω |= νi % νj ; which would establish the semantic to syntactic implications for con-
ditions 1 and 2. Consider some arbitrary state ω ∈ Ω. Suppose Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω) and
ω |= νi ∧ νj . Consider the nth entry of these kens. (a) Suppose ω |= νni ψn = iψn, and
suppose that ω |= νnj ψn = ˆjψn. Then, ∀ω′ ∈ Sj(ω), ω′ |= ¬ψn. But if Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω),
then ∀ω′ ∈ Si(ω), ω′ |= ¬ψn, which contradicts the statement that ω |= iψn. There-
fore, ω |= (νnj ψn = jψn ∨ νnj ψn = ˙jψn). Cases (b), ω |= νni ψn = ˆiψn and (c)
ω |= νni ψn = ˙iψn can dealt with analogously to case (a).
Now we can show that (3.a) implies (3.b): By the definition of (3.a), there is a state
ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that every state reachable from ω′ is reflexive in both Ri and Rj . So,
at each one of those states, iψn → ψn for all formulas and all agents.
We can show that (4.a) implies (4.b): Suppose that (4.a) holds, but not (4.b). So let
ω′ |= ν(ω)i ∧ µ(ω)j for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), and yet, ν(ω)i is different from µ(ω)j . Case
(a): At ω′ ∈ Si(ω′), for some ψn, we have ω′ |= iψn ∧ ˆjψn. But if Si(ω′) ⊆ Sj(ω′′)
for some ω′′, then ω′′ |= ψn, in which case we cannot have ˆjψn at every state in the
component. Case (b): At ω′ ∈ Sj(ω′), for some ψn, we have ω′ |= iψn ∧ ˙jψn. But
if Sj(ω′) ⊆ Si(ω′′) for some ω′′, then ω′′′ |= ¬ψn for some ω′′′ ∈ Si(ω′′), in which case
we cannot have iψn at every state in the component. All other cases are trivial, or
resemble one of the above.
We can show that (5.a) implies (5.b): Suppose ω′ ∈ Si(ω′) ∩ Sj(ω′). Suppose that for
some ψn, ω |= iψn. By reflexivity of Ri, ω |= ψn. Now, suppose ω |= ˆjψn. By
reflexivity of Rj at ω′, ω′ |= ¬ψn, a contradiction.
Finally, that (1.b) implies (2.b) implies (4.b) is trivial. Also, that (1.b) implies (3.b) is
trivial.
We can show that (3.b) implies (4.b): Suppose (3.b) holds and that (4.b) does not hold.
(3.b), implies that there is a state ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that every state reachable from ω′
is reflexive in both Ri and Rj . Suppose ω′ |= ν(ω)i ∧ µ(ω)j for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), and
yet, ν(ω)i is different from µ(ω)j . Let ω′′ be reachable from ω′. Case (a): suppose that
at ω′′, for some ψn, we have ω′′ |= iψn ∧ ˆjψn. By reflexivity of both Ri and Rj ,
ω′′ |= ψn∧¬ψn, a contradiction. Case (b): ω′′ |= iψn∧ ˙jψn. Then, for some reachable
ω′′′, ω′′′ |= ¬ψn. Since Ri is reflexive at ω′′′, it cannot be the case that ω′′′ |= iψn, thus
contradicting the assumption that i’s ken is the same across each state in the component.
Finally, we can show that (3.b) implies (5.b): (3.b), implies that there is a state ω′ ∈
ΩG(ω) such that every state reachable from ω′ is reflexive in both Ri and Rj . Let ω′′ be
reachable from ω′. Suppose that at ω′′, for some ψn, we have ω′′ |= iψn ∧ ˆjψn. By
reflexivity of both Ri and Rj , ω′′ |= ψn ∧ ¬ψn, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5 Suppose that there exists ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that for all
n ∈ {1, ...,m}, ω′ |= ¬(iψn ∧ ˆjψn). So, suppose ω |= iψn. This implies that
ω′ |= ˙jψn∨jψn. But since the language is very rich, we are only left with ω′ |= jψn.
This is true for all propositions. Therefore, if (5.b) holds, then there is a state in which
the agents have the same ken. That is, ω |= ¬CG¬(νi ∧ µj).
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Proof of Theorem 8 Suppose that there is some ω ∈ Ω such that ω |= CG(dxi ∧
dyj ) ∧ (x 6= y). Then, for all ω′ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω′ |= Di(ν(ω′)i) = x 6= y = Dj(µ(ω′)j).
By Assumption 2, it follows that ω′ |= ¬(ν(ω′)i ∼ µ(ω′)j). But this contradicts (1.b).
Namely, that there exists a state ω′′ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ω′′ |= ν(ω′′)i ∼ µ(ω′′)j .
Appendix B
Map to Bacharach (1985)
Note that by Lemma 4, if Di(ν(ω)i) for some ω ∈ Ω, then for all ω′ ∈ Ii(ω), Di(ν(ω′)i) =
Di(ν(ω)i). So, for each agent i ∈ N , we can define a function Hi : 2Ω → A, where
Hi(Ii(ω)) = Di(ν(ω)i). Furthermore, we can define another function hi : Ω → A such
that for all ω′ ∈ Ii(ω), hi(ω′) = Hi(Ii(ω)). This thus defines a map from our decision
functions into Bacharach’s framework.
Finally, we can also define Bacharach’s Sure-Thing Principle: If Hi(Ii(ω)) = Hi(Ii(ω′))
and clearly Ii(ω)∩Ii(ω′) = ∅, thenHi(m(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′))) = Hi(Ii(ω)). Now,m(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)),
in Bacharach (1985) would simply be equal to Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω′). This is precisely where there
is a loss of information, which was criticised by Moses and Nachum (1990): The union of
information cells is not itself an information cell. On the other hand, if m were taken to
be the “cell merge" operation, then m(Ii(ω), Ii(ω′)) would itself be an information cell,
and thus have a clear interpretation in terms of the information it contains.
Map to Aumann & Hart (2006)
Aumann and Hart (2006) derive their agreement theorem using the framework developed
in Aumann (1999) for the analysis of interactive knowledge in a partitional state space.
Essentially, restricting ourselves to Ψ00, we can define a mapping νi 7→ e ∈ P ∗, where,
e :=
∧
x∈{pn|νni pn=ipn}
x ∧
∧
y∈{¬pn|νni pn=ˆipn}
y
That is, e is the conjunction of all the propositions (or their negation) that i knows, and
all the propositions pn for which νni pn = ˙ipn are ignored.
Given this, if we have ν(ω)i, then e is the “minimal" formula that i knows at ω, in the
sense that if ie′ then e→ e′. Note furthermore, that given our “richness" assumption on
Ψ00, we have that if e 6= e′ then ¬(e ∧ e′), and if νi 7→ e′ and µi 7→ e′′, then inf{νi, µi} 7→
(e′ ∨ e′′). Given this map, our decision functions Di : Vi → A become Hi : P ∗ → A.
The Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle now becomes,
|=
∧
i∈N
∧
e,e′∈P ∗
[
Hi(e) = Hi(e
′) ∧ ¬(e ∧ e′)→ Hi(e ∨ e′) = Hi(e)
]
which is the formulation given in Aumann and Hart (2006).
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